Publication | Page 589 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)

Table of Contents
Gilani’s Background Gilani’s Agenda The Future Verification of a future FMCT Conclusion Sir Arthur Charles Clarke A science fiction writer par excellence Clarke as a crusader against anti- science beliefs Visionary Clarke Professor Edward Lorenz 1. What is the NGO SCWVS about? 2. What is the kind of work it does? 3. What is your role? 4. How does your training as medical personnel help you to deal with the subject of chemical weapons? 5. Does this training also help you in your personal interaction with the victims? In terms of building confidence etc. 6. Could you give us a brief background of the chemical weapons attack on Iran? 7. What were the chemicals used in the attack? 8. What were the long term effects of such attacks on the victims? 9. What could be certain preventive measure against a chemical weapon attack? 10. Do you think that the international community has not handled the chemical weapons victims of Iran with sensitivity? 11. What is the link between Biological, chemical and toxic weapons? 12.What are the new and emerging chemical weapons? 14. What do you think are the reasons that chemical weapon are used in war fighting and against civilians? 15. How effective is the moral norm against the use of inhumane weapons? 16.What is the role of global politics in the issue of chemical weapons? 17. Do you see a similarity of chemical weapons victims in Iran with the victims of Bhopal Gas tragedy in India in 1984? 18.Is there an International law that provides relief and compensation to chemical weapon victim and punishes the perpetrators? 19.Are there any compensatory claims for a chemical weapon’s victim? 20. What course of action and relief can chemical weapons victims claim for? 21.Has this work with chemical weapon’s victim affected you personally? 22.Do you think enough is being done in terms of Treaty, Conventions at the international level to prevent chemical weapons use? 23.What are the efforts that can be undertaken to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons? 24.What more needs to be done? 25.Any other issue or question that has not been mentioned before and you would like to talk about. Biological Weapons Use: Real Time or Futuristic Conclusion
India Should Revisit its Tibet Policy April 04, 2008 Abanti Bhattacharya

The Indian government’s response to the ongoing protests in Tibet has been to merely state its “distress” about the situation and reaffirm its position that Tibet is an “internal” affair of China. New Delhi has assured Beijing that its position on the Tibet issue is “clear and consistent” and that this “would not change in the future.” The Indian position is based on its traditional opposition to separatist movements and to foreign intervention in support of such movements. Also, given the present dynamics of India-China relations with greater synergy as the goal, New Delhi does not favour supporting the Tibetan cause. However, protests by Tibetans have implications for India as the Tibet issue is entangled with the India-China border dispute.

The Tibet issue is rooted in the histories of the three countries – India, China and Tibet. Tibet has existed throughout history as a distinct civilization with rich culture, language, religion, polity and identity. Through the centuries India and Tibet have maintained strong religious and trade ties, and have shared a peaceful border. But the advent of British power in the Indian sub-continent altered the nature of this relationship.

The British Raj’s policy towards Tibet was shaped by the Great Game and the need to prevent Russia from posing a threat to India. It was against this backdrop that the Raj called for the tripartite Simla conference in October 1913, which was attended by representatives from British India (Henry McMahon), Republican China (Chen Yifan) and Tibet (Lonchen Shatra). The goal was to settle the boundary between British India and Tibet on the one hand and between Tibet and China on the other. The result was the Simla Agreement of 1914, which the Chinese representative initialled but only under British pressure. The Agreement divided Tibet into Inner and Outer Tibet. China was given sovereignty over Inner Tibet but only suzerain control over Outer Tibet. And the boundary between India and Tibet was demarcated, with the Raj retaining trading and extra-territorial rights in Outer Tibet.

Independent India inherited this arrangement, which boiled down to sustaining Tibet as a buffer zone with de facto independent status under Chinese suzerainty. In the post-1949 period, when the People’s Republic of China came into being, India urged China to let Tibet continue as an autonomous region in line with its historical status, religious, cultural and political identity. However, the entry of 20,000 PLA troops in 1950-51 into Tibet ended its independent status and eventually brought to the fore the India-China border issue.

During his 1954 visit to China, Jawaharlal Nehru had raised the issue of inaccurate border alignment as depicted in some Chinese maps. Premier Zhou Enlai responded that these maps were reproductions of old Kuomintang maps and that his government has had no time to revise them. However, Nehru’s December 14, 1958 letter, in which he had once again raised the issue of Chinese maps depicting the border alignment inaccurately, elicited a different response from Zhou. The Chinese Premier wrote back on January 23, 1959 stating that the Sino-Indian border was never delimited and that China has never recognised the McMahon Line. After the 1962 India-China war, China began to claim some 90,000 square kilometres of Indian territory in the eastern sector and 38,000 square kilometres in the Aksai Chin area. These claims flow directly from China’s control over Tibet and its felt need to consolidate its rule over this rebellious territory.

Between 1947 and 1954, India’s position on Tibet was based on recognising it as an independent nation. Tibet represented itself as an independent country at the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March-April 1947. But India subsequently gave up this position on April 29, 1954, when it signed an agreement with China on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet. Under the terms of the agreement, India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges that it had inherited from the British Raj and recognised Tibet as part of China. This, in effect, was a unilateral concession without the Indian government gaining anything in return.

In subsequent decades, New Delhi has repeatedly reiterated that Tibet is a part of China, in spite of the latter’s encroachment into and extravagant claims over Indian territory, the border war it imposed on India in 1962, and the unresolved border dispute at the centre of which lies Tibet. In effect, such reiteration has meant the dilution of a bargaining card in the border negotiations. In 2003, the Vajpayee government went further than any other government before by stating that the “Tibetan Autonomous Region of China is part of the territory of China.” This has two critical implications for Indian security. First, it excluded Inner Tibet (present day Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai provinces) from the geographical notion of Tibet, thus recognising Inner Tibet as Chinese land. Second, it provided China a greater opening to advance its claims on Arunachal Pradesh. For, Outer Tibet or the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), according to the Chinese definition, includes Arunachal Pradesh, which it refers to as its ‘southern state’.

India has consistently failed to understand nuances in Chinese diplomatic practice and negotiating tactics. China is tackling the Tibet problem at two levels. One, it is involving the Dalai Lama’s representatives in fruitless talks, while also disparaging him as a ‘splittist’ who aims to disintegrate China. Two, it is arm-twisting India by repeatedly claiming that Arunachal Pradesh is part of China. Here, it is worth noting that at the sixth round of talks with Tibetan representatives Chinese negotiators had conveyed that the Dalai Lama should accept Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, which the Dalai Lama has refused to accept. China is not seriously considering a resolution to the Tibet issue or the border dispute with India. It is simply buying time till the Dalai Lama passes away, after which, it hopes, the Tibetan movement would fizzle out. This would also further weaken India’s bargaining position on the border negotiations while at the same time gaining for itself greater manoeuvrability.

The presence of the Dalai Lama in India along with 120,000 Tibetan refugees spread across 35 settlements is leverage for India. But India has so far steadfastly avoided using the Tibetan card. Given the intricate linkage between the Tibet issue and the border dispute, India needs to revise its policy on Tibet. Its present policy of appeasem*nt and unilateral concessions has not stopped China from claiming Indian territory. Chinese maps continue to show Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, and Jammu and Kashmir as falling outside India. Some Chinese maps still do not represent Beijing’s revised position on Sikkim.

The latest unrest among Tibetans provides an opportunity for India to revisit and revise its Tibet policy. First, India should make it clear to the Chinese government that developments in Tibet are a concern for India and that it cannot remain unaffected by developments there. Second, on the border issue, instead of merely restating that all of Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of its territory, India should make it very clear that these are non-negotiable. Third, upholding its democratic principles as well as its cultural affinity with the Tibetans, India should impress upon the Chinese that while it does not support political activity by Tibetans in its soil, it also cannot suppress peaceful demonstrations by them. Fourth, India should move away from its ‘over-cautious’ and diffident policy on Tibet and adopt a more independent stand that takes into account its national interests.

East Asia India, Tibet, India-China Relations, China Yousuf Raza Gilani: A Tall Man with a Task of Tall Order April 03, 2008 Ashok K. Behuria

Yousuf Raza Gilani was nominated by Asif Ali Zardari as the PPP candidate for prime ministership on March 22, 2008. On that occasion, Zardari called upon Gilani “to accept the heavy responsibility and lead the coalition government and the nation to greater heights and a glorious future.” Pakistan’s National Assembly elected Gilani as Prime Minister (264 votes to 42 over Pervez Elahi of PML-Q) two days later.

Gilani started off well by announcing that as Prime Minister (PM) he would first wish to order the release of judges kept under house arrest by the previous administration. Police forces promptly responded to this wish. Even before he was sworn in as PM, police were seen lifting the barricades and setting the judges free. Gilani also invited all parties to join the coalition in the interest of democracy and work together to establish the supremacy of parliament, constitution and rule of law. Many in Pakistan termed it as the ultimate victory of the people.

Makhdoom Gilani also exhibited the right spirit of reconciliation when he decided to meet Makhdoom Amin Fahim. This meeting came in the backdrop of rumours that the PPP would split if Gilani were to be chosen over Fahim. During the meeting, Gilani addressed Fahim as ‘my elder brother” and “my leader” to express his sense of loyalty and respect to the senior leader. It is difficult to say whether this has proved enough to assuage Fahim’s injured feelings at not being nominated for the prime ministership after initial projections to this effect.

Gilani’s Background

Those familiar with the tradition of “Pirs” and “Makhdooms” might not have found Gilani’s spirit of reconciliation surprising. Makhdooms share a wider ‘Sufi’ tradition and respect one another. They have considerable influence in their respective areas. It is important to note that out of the four names suggested for prime ministership, three were Makhdooms. Gilani is a descendant of the famous Qadiriya saint Musa Pak Shaheed of Multan, who came from Iran. Gilani is also related to the Makhdoom of Jamaldinwali and the Pir of Pagara. His mother is from the former family and her sister is married to the Pir of Pagara.

Makhdoom families were pampered by the British and later invited by the Muslim League to join the Pakistan movement. Gilani’s family had in fact joined the movement in the 1940s and were devoted followers of Jinnah.

Born in 1952, Gilani began his political career in the mid-1970s. He joined the Pakistan Muslim League, which was revived by Zia-ul-Haq in the early 1980s. He won the 1985 elections and became a federal minister in Muhammad Khan Junejo’s government. He, however, left Junejo’s cabinet after developing serious differences with him and rushed to Karachi to meet Benazir Bhutto and offered to work with her when she was in the political wilderness.

In the 1988 elections, Gilani defeated Nawaz Sharif and became a minister in Benazir’s cabinet. He was chosen as speaker of the National Assembly when Benazir’s PPP returned to power in 1993. He differed with Benazir over issues where he felt she was in the wrong. He invoked her wrath but inspired her quiet admiration at the same time.

Gilani lost to PML-N candidate, Sikandar Hayat Bosan, in 1997, when Nawaz won a massive landslide in Punjab. He could not join the electoral fray in 2002 because he was arrested on corruption charges by the Musharraf regime and put in jail. He supported his nephew Syed Asad Murtaza Gillani in the 2002 elections. Murtaza won and joined the breakaway PPP faction, which supported Musharraf. This led to rumours that Gilani has switched loyalties to Musharraf.

But such speculation proved to be untrue and Gilani continued to languish in jail for five long years until his release in October 2006. He spent his time in jail productively and wrote his autobiography, Chahe Yusuf ki Sada. After his release, Gilani worked full-time as a party-man and won the confidence of senior leaders within the party. Fahim, who led the PPP in Benazir’s absence, was particularly fond of him for his principles and his devotion to the party.

Gilani’s Agenda

On March 29, Gilani became the first PM of Pakistan to win a unanimous vote of confidence. He unveiled his 100 days’ relief and reform plan the same day to wide acclaim. His agenda reflected a sombre and reconciliatory mood rather than a confrontationist and combative one. It touched upon a whole range of issues – education, terrorism, legislative supremacy, administrative reforms and foreign policy.

Gilani began his address by stating that ‘dahshatgardi’ (terrorism) was the most critical issue to be addressed by his government and held that “the restoration of law and order and total elimination of terrorism will be (its) first priority.” He described extremist forces as “people who had chosen the path of violence as a means of expressing their views”, and appealed to them to give up their approach, talk to the government and join the political forces “in this journey of democracy”. He argued that the roots of terrorism lay in “poverty and illiteracy” and promised to soon evolve a new package for the tribal areas as an “important pillar of our strategy in the war against terrorism”. He proposed the removal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. He also stated that his government would set up a Madressah Welfare Authority to audit funds and provide a uniform syllabus for Madressahs in consultation with all stakeholders. He made it clear that his government’s approach in dealing with extremists will be through dialogue rather than force.

Gilani’s statement on foreign policy was rather brief and signalled no major departure from that of the previous administration. He said his government’s policy would be based on “goodwill and peaceful co-existence” and it would seek relations with all countries on the basis of sovereign equality. He made it clear that his government wanted “strong and close relations with America and Europe” and sought to “promote peace and brotherhood with neighbouring countries”. In line with Musharraf’s policy, he also sought closer ties with the Muslim world and China.

On the Kashmir issue, he stated, to thunderous applause from the house, that the “sacrifices of the Kashmiri people would not go in vain”. He made ‘Kashmir’ appear central to the ongoing India-Pakistan peace process. He said that his government would carry forward the (composite) talks with India, but added that confidence-building measures will be useful only when they lead to the resolution of the problem “in the light of the aspirations of the Kashmiri people and international principles.”

His Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Qamar Zaman Kaira, taking this cue has even suggested that the government would follow the Kashmir policy Benazir carved out during the 1990s. In fact, Benazir had followed an inflexible and hard line approach then. Zaman has also called Kashmir the “basic issue” which needs to be resolved for “better ties” with India. Hussain Haqqani, who has been appointed an ambassador-at-large and special advisor on foreign affairs and national security to Gilani, has given a further hint that normalisation of relations with India will be a priority for the new government but no “unilateral concessions” would be made.

On the political front, Gilani announced certain initiatives that are likely to augur well for democracy in Pakistan. He gave the assurance that the PM would henceforth answer questions directly in the house. He also proposed to set up a ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ to facilitate the transition from military rule to democracy. On a symbolic note, to underline the supremacy of parliament, he held that the largest national flag would be flown from the parliament house. The message could not have been lost on the adjuncts of the military establishment that his government has replaced.

But the major focus of the programmes highlighted by him was on taking prompt measures to avert an economic crisis. He referred to the problems faced by people in accessing electricity and water as well as shortages in atta (flour) supply. His proposed policies thus provided for farmer-friendly measures, a National Employment Schemes to provide jobs for the poor, austerity measures like cutting down on government expenditures, including 40 per cent cut-down on PM’s house, and a million-housing-units plan to provide home for the homeless.

Significantly, his stand vis-à-vis the Army was cautious. He welcomed the Army Chief’s decision to withdraw serving military officers from civilian posts, but expressed his willingness to accommodate some of them if civilian replacements were not available for the time being. After Musharraf’s retirement, the Army has regained its legitimacy as an important institution in Pakistan and this perhaps explains his moderation. He stressed rather indirectly that it was necessary “for solidarity and progress of the country that every institution fulfilled its specific responsibilities,” and added that “Governance” should remain the “responsibility of only the people”. Strangely, he was silent on the issue of Musharraf’s continuation as President and did not raise the issue of restoration of the judges either.

In an important remark, Gilani acknowledged the sufferings of the Baloch people and promised that his government would work towards provincial autonomy. As a first step, it would remove the concurrent list from the constitution within a year, enabling states to have exclusive authority over certain affairs.

The Future

Gilani has a lot of ground to cover in the coming days. His first 100 days in office may not be a smooth ride, given the challenges he faces at the moment. The ministers he has chosen from different parties will have to work together to fulfil the promises he has made. Moreover, his opening speech was full of general principles and guidelines for his government. But in the coming days he may find it difficult to apply these principles while dealing with more specific and intricate issues like devolution of power to the provinces, Kalabagh dam, sectarian violence and linkages between Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban. He also has to balance his moderate approach towards terrorism with efforts to secure the flow of material help from Western countries.

Gilani has to lead a coalition that survives more on the mutual hatred towards Musharraf than common love for democracy. Sceptics in Pakistan argue that Musharraf’s departure, which looks more certain now than ever before, could lead to the re-emergence of factional rivalries and rip the coalition apart. There is also a suspicion that Gilani may be asked to leave after Zardari’s election to the National Assembly. It is too early to say whether Gilani can fulfil his agenda and succeed in his mission during the 100 days he has set for himself.

South Asia Pakistan Politics, Pakistan Verification of the FMCT: Lessons from IAEA, OPCW and CTBTO April - June 2008 Arun Vishwanathan

The successful completion of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), some believe, would be an important step towards the ultimate goal of elimination of nuclear weapons. The FMCT will affect individual states differently due to the variance in their nuclear fuel cycles and pre-existing inventories of fissile material.1 It is this difference which has led to divergent opinions among experts as to what the ultimate aim of the FMCT should be and how it fits into the broader arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation processes. This article seeks to study the current debate surrounding the verification of a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and posit as to whether the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) could provide a verification mechanism for a future FMCT.

With the recent breaking of the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the perceptible movement at the CD on the issue; studying the nature, scope as well as the implications of any future treaty has become very important.2 For India, the issue assumes greater significance due to the fact that the Indian government under the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement has made a very clear cut commitment to work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral FMCT.3 More importantly, India will be most affected by the conclusion of at future FMCT regardless of the scope of the treaty. This is due to the fact that India possesses no hedge-stocks, unlike the case with most other nuclear-weapon-states (de facto or otherwise). This fact explains the rationale behind the importance that India ties to “effective verification” of a future treaty which is nondiscriminatory, universal and credible.

There are three major issues that are of significance to India in the treaty. They are firstly, the definition of the term “fissile material”; secondly, the debate about the “scope” of the treaty with respect to production and stocks; and finally, the debate with regard to verification of the treaty. However, given the constraints of space as well as the focus of the issue, this essay will focus only on the issues surrounding the verification of a future FMCT.

Another point to be noted is that whatever the scope of the eventual FMCT, it will be the five nuclear-weapon states and the three states with nuclear weapons outside the NPT (namely India, Pakistan and Israel) which will be substantively affected. As the Non-Nuclear-Weapon states (NNWS) have undertaken not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material, and are parties to a comprehensive safeguards agreement, they already satisfy

the requirements of the FMCT. Given that India possesses no hedge-stocks, unlike the case with most other nuclear-weapon-states (de facto or otherwise), it is India that will be most affected by the conclusion of a FMCT.

Verification of a future FMCT

In the Shannon Mandate the task of verification is described as an “effectively verifiable treaty.”4 To achieve this end it is imperative that the verification mechanism be non-discriminatory, universal, and credible.” To ensure that the principles are followed in letter as well as spirit it is necessary that all rights and obligations for verification must apply equally to all member states. In other words, no material, at least that being produced after entry into force, must be diverted to nuclear weapon use, equally for all treaty members. The measures to verify this ban therefore must be the same for everybody. India has already made a statement supporting such a move saying that “the treaty should incorporate a verification mechanism in order to provide the assurance that all States were complying with their obligations.”5

However, the recent anti-verification stand taken by the United States has made matters very difficult. Dr. Christopher A. Ford, the US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation in a March 2007 statement ominously delivered at a conference on “Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right,” said:

“…it is the conclusion of the United States that effective verification of an FMCT cannot be achieved. The United States has concluded that there is no achievable combination of verification and monitoring means and measures that would enable the United States and other parties to the agreement to detect non-compliance in time to convince a violator to reverse its actions, or to take such steps as may be needed to reduce the threat presented and deny the violator the benefits of its wrongdoing.”6

The US stand is that any verification scheme for an FMCT would have to address six fundamental verification issues: (1) detection of production of fissile material at clandestine facilities; (2) monitoring declared fissile material production facilities; (3) providing for the exclusion from verification of fissile material produced for non-proscribed but sensitive (e.g., military) uses after the Treaty’s production cutoff date; (4) monitoring material declared as having been produced after the cutoff date, to verify that it is not diverted; (5) excluding from verification fissile material produced before the cutoff date; and (6) determination of acceptable end-use of material produced after the cutoff date.7 Citing core national security concerns as well as the associated costs of implementing any such verification, the US has stated its opposition to any verification mechanism to be put in place for the treaty.

There are two important questions relating to the verification of an FMCT which require careful consideration. Firstly, who will verify the treaty? And secondly, what kind of verification regime will be implemented? Many experts are of the opinion that the easiest way forward would be to entrust the IAEA with the additional responsibility of verifying the FMCT. Though this does seem to be quite a logical step due to the fact that many of the existing IAEA safeguard techniques and procedures could be directly applied to the verification of the FMCT; the question that arises is whether the IAEA safeguards system is the optimum one for this purpose. It is important to take note of the fact that the OPCW and the CTBTO are two additional multilateral verification organisations which also possess similar capabilities and performs similar functions as the IAEA. Therefore, one must also assess the capabilities of these organisations to verify the FMCT rather than dismissing them off hand.

Currently, there are three major multilateral verification organisations in place – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). There is a great deal of similarities and convergences between the three organisations. Each of the above mentioned organisations gathers and processes information to help verify the compliance of states with their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. Additionally, these organisations also conduct on-site inspections as an integral part of verification.

Therefore, the positives of using the OPCW verification mechanism for a future FMCT definitely needs to be studied carefully. The first advantage is that using the OPCW-type mechanism would immediately minimize differences in implementation in the three types of states involved: the nuclear weapon states (NWS); the de facto nuclear-weapon states (Israel, India, and Pakistan); and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under the NPT. This would automatically remove the biggest hurdle in the way of successful FMCT negotiations.

However, there definitely are drawbacks of taking such a course. Firstly, establishing a new organisation would extend and complicate (and possibly even stall) the negotiation of an FMCT. Secondly, such a verification system could be very expensive and create additional layers of unnecessary bureaucracy. Given the fact that the IAEA has been working for several years with zero real growth budgets and facing acute financial constraints; it remains to be seen where the international community would find the financial resources for a new international multilateral verification organisation.

Given the situation, another possible way out could be to encourage cooperation between international organisations. The CTBT for instance seeks to cooperate with the IAEA and makes use of the Agency’s expertise and facilities.8 However, attempts to put in place pan-treaty verification organisation, or crosstreaty verification mechanisms have not succeeded in the past. The failures have mainly been due to political hurdles. For example, during initial CTBT negotiations there were proposals to have the IAEA to verify the CTBT. However, as it became clear that not all IAEA members would sign the CTBT, the proposal was dropped. A similar situation could take place in the case of the FMCT too. Another problem in joint verification mechanisms is the rightful concern among states to sharing of confidential information across verification organisations. State parties are likely to object to any cooperation that could result in the release of such information to non-states parties or to the verification organisations of other regimes.

Therefore, it is quite clear that the verification mechanism of any future FMCT would have to “pick and choose” the useful practices and mechanisms existing across the IAEA, OPCW and the CTBTO. Given, the problems associated with each of these multilateral international verification mechanisms it does not seem likely that imposing the responsibilities of FMCT verification on any one of these bodies would serve the purpose. For example, in case of declared facilities in state parties, the existing IAEA system of inspections, containment and surveillance would do fairly well. However, the IAEA safeguards mechanism has had problems with detecting undeclared facilities. The Iraqi and the North Korean activities are cases in point. However, with the adoption of the Additional Protocol, the Agency has addressed this issue to a great extent. To overcome this challenge, the verification of FMCT could borrow from the challenge-inspection mechanism of the OPCW. Under this mechanism, CWC parties are expected to use national means for looking for undeclared facilities. If a party becomes aware of a suspect site, it can request that the OPCW undertake a challenge inspection. However, a challenge inspection can be blocked by a three-fourths vote of the CWC Executive Council.9

Therefore, it can be said that given the shortcomings and the positives of various verification mechanisms, serious thought should be given to the idea of setting up a new international agency to verify the FMCT. However, The safeguards system that would be evolved by the new agency would, of course, use as much of the IAEA or the OPCW or the CTBTO system as is desirable and useful, and would add elements to make the system appropriate for verifying an FMCT.

However, there are several areas for possible cooperation between these different verification mechanisms keeping the confidentiality of state parties’ information intact.

The first possible area of cooperation is infrastructure and equipment sharing. For the verification of the FMCT, the sharing of certified radionuclide laboratories might be explored. If confidentiality of information can be assured, such laboratories being maintained by the IAEA and the CTBTO Prepcom can be made use for the purpose of FMCT verification. Also, it might be possible to pool the use of global communication infrastructures.10 Currently, both the IAEA and the CTBTO Prepcom are maintaining fairly independent global monitoring communications system. Use of these facilities could be explored for the purpose of FMCT verification thereby saving considerable costs and unnecessary duplication of facilities and equipment. However, it must be understood that certain inspection equipment is specific to an inspection organisation and might not be of use to other organisations. However, the reverse too is true. Certain inspection equipment is generic and when not in use, can be shared by other organisations.

Another possible area of cooperation is training of staff. Though confidentiality concerns would be a barrier for free exchange, sharing of staff between organisations; it would greatly help if for example, the IAEA could share its experiences of past years with fairly new verification organisations like the CTBTO Prepcom and the OPCW.

Conclusion

The FMCT is only going to gain more and more importance by the day. However, verification remains one of the major stumbling blocks before the successful negotiation of the treaty. Though, the anti-verification stance of the US is a major challenge; the decision on the actual verification ‘model’ to be adopted by the FMCT is as much a great a challenge. It does seem as if a large section of experts and decision makers support the verification duties of a future FMCT to be handed over to the IAEA. However, given the lacunae of the IAEA system and political concerns of several member states outlined above, this article makes a case for putting in place a verification mechanism that picks and chooses from the existing verification mechanisms of the OPCW, the IAEA and the CTBTO Prepcom.

References

  • 1. Victor Bragin and John Carlson, “FMCT: Some Significant divisions in the scope debate,” Disarmament Forum, no.2, 1999, pp. 29-31.
  • 2. There has been the recent movement at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with an agreement being reached on discussing a Fissile Cutoff Treaty separately from issues like Nuclear Disarmament, PAROS, and Negative Security Assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states. This has broken the deadlock which has been preventing any forward movement at the CD on any of these issues for over a decade.
  • 3. Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, July 18, 2005, available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/ 07/20050718-6.html (accessed on May 14, 2008).
  • 4. Conference on Disarmament, Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on Consultations on the Most Appropriate Arrangement to Negotiate a Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, CD/1299, March 24, 1995, available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/shannon.html (accessed on April 21, 2008).
  • 5. Statement made by Jayant Prasad, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, May 17, 2006, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/speech/2006/05/17da01.htm (accessed on April 19, 2007).
  • 6. “The United States and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” Dr. Christopher A. Ford, United States Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, delivered at the Conference on “Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right”, Annecy, France, March 17, 2007, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/ other/81950.htm
  • 7. Annette Schaper, “Principles of the verification for a future Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, p. 3, available at http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prif58.pdf (accessed on May 14, 2008).
  • 8. Article II of the CTBT states that: ‘The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency’.
  • 9. Chemical Weapons Convention, Part X – Challenge Inspections Pursuant to Article IX
  • 10. Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier, VERTIC IAEA-SM-367/15/
Remembering Sir Clarke and Prof. Lorenz April - June 2008 Arvind Mishra

Technology has its critical place in human society. With their new ideas and discoveries and writings, scientists and writers bridge the gap between the knowledge of science and its understanding in society. In death of Arthur C. Clarke (1917-2008), scientific community has lost one of its critical cheerleaders and a space optimist. Professor Edward Lorenz, who died in April 2008, is regarded as the Father of chaos theory.

The ideas and innovations promulgated by both these great minds have left a profound impact on the development of various technologies. It would be difficult to directly identify their contribution towards development of various defensive technologies to be used as prevention against biological and chemical weapons. However, their work has indirectly impacted much of the happenings in the arena of biological and chemical weapons. Biological and chemical weapons find mention in Clarke’s work, like The Final Odyssey (1997), the fourth and final book in the Space Odyssey series. Prof. Lorenz, a meteorologist, used computers to increase the precision of weather forecasts. Based on this discovery, the idea of plum models for the dispersion of chemical and biological agents was developed.

Sir Arthur Charles Clarke

With the demise of Sir Arthur Charles Clarke in Sri Lanka on March 19, 2008 an era of space optimism appears to have come to an end now. His work is usually regarded as an optimistic view of science, empowering man’s exploration of his solar system and even beyond. Besides, his domain remained not only extrapolating about humanity’s technological abilities, but also exploring all the possibilities of interface between science and society. With his death, world has lost a passionate champion and promoter of scientific thought who invoked scientists to play a greater role in public policy and demanded also that political leaders world over must take science seriously.

A science fiction writer par excellence

While Clarke had a few stories published in certain Fanzines between 1937 and 1945, his first professional sales appeared in ‘Astounding Science Fiction’ under the editorship Johan Campbell in 1946: “Loophole” was published in April, while “Rescue Party “, his first sale, was published in May. He briefly worked as Assistant Editor of Science Abstracts (1949) before devoting himself to writing full-time from 1951 onward.

As a science fiction writer par excellence, his recurrent themes included humans evolving into a space-faring species and making contact with aliens. But as a practitioner of science he never accommodated ideas that lacked a serious scientific approach in almost all of his science fiction works. In an essay in Science, he warned, “For more than a century science and its occasionally ugly sister technology has been the chief driving forces shaping our world. They decide the kinds of futures that are possible. Human wisdom must decide which are desirable.”

Clarke often used his stories to caution humanity against many forms of undesirable futures for us earthlings. He imagined supercomputers taking control as HAL in ‘2001: A Space Odyssey’ and the extermination of life on earth by nuclear warfare, asteroid impacts or climate change. He had a solid grounding in physics and mathematics, and a deep understanding of societal concerns of science and vice versa in today’s world. Attributes like such helped him in becoming an effective, dependable communicator of science, especially on space travel, communication technologies and futuristic scenarios.

Clarke’s great legacy constitute among other things is unbound inspiration to generations of space explorers, software engineers and ‘technopreneurs’. He triggered the globalisation of information-some sort a state of a global village, ‘Vasudhaiv Kutumbkam’ [The whole world is a family as the oft repeated quote from Indian scriptures pronounce] by proposing the geosynchronous communications satellite way back in 1945 — satellites that circle the earth at the same speed as the earth itself is turning, and therefore appear to stay in a fixed position. The concept was published in ‘Wireless World’ in October that year. In recognition of his contributions the geostationary orbit 36,000 kilometers (22,000 mi) above the equator is officially recognised by the International Astronomical Union as a “Clarke Orbit”.

As we know today this idea having transformed into reality catering to the needs of all satellite based communications and the web communication also has become an integral part of the epoch making technology. But alas, Clarke could not even think of patenting the idea and had he done it he would have earned millions out of that very idea. But weep not readers, he nevertheless became a millionaire in his life time
and spent a life no less than a tycoon.

Clarke as a crusader against anti- science beliefs

Clarke was a die hard crusader against all sort of unscientific claims, anti-science beliefs and superstitious practices, from creationism and scientology to astrology and fire-walking. In these endeavours he joined other campaigners including Carl Sagan, Stephen Jay Gould and the magician James Randi. He made a modest living as a professional skeptical enquirer. He hosted many television series that probed and even exposed numerous mysteries, superstitions and the paranormal. Also, he time and again challenged astrologers to explain rationally the basis of their work. Though the challenge was always avoided, and astrology continues to exercise much influence over politics, public policy, business and everyday life in Sri Lanka. Yet he never gave up the struggle for rational discussion and debate in public affairs, and remained outspoken till the last breath of his life.

While accepting the Kalinga Prize for Popularization of Science, 1961 by UNESCO in
New Delhi in 1962, he iterated, “Two of the greatest evils that afflict Asia, and keep millions in a state of physical, mental and spiritual poverty, are fanaticism and superstition. Science, in its cultural as well as its technological sense, is the great enemy of both; it can provide the only weapons that will overcome them and lead whole nations to a better life.”

Born in Mine head, Somerset, England he immigrated to Sri Lanka in 1956 largely to pursue his interest in scuba diving and lived there until his death. He served in the Royal Air force as a radar instructor and technician during 1941-1946, where he proposed the most talked about satellite communication systems in 1945 which won him the Franklin Institute Stuart Ballantine Gold Medal in 1963 along with a nomination in 1994 for Nobel Prize. He was Chairman of the British Interplanetary Society from 1947-1950 and again in 1953.

Visionary Clarke

Though his story “The Sentinel” [1948] was rejected for a BBC competition it changed the course of Clarke’s career. It formed the basis for ‘A Space Odyssey’. Clarke’s later works feature a technologically advanced but prejudiced mankind being confronted by a superior alien intelligence. Quite interestingly, in one of his novels, ‘Fountains of Paradise’ he conceptualized ‘space elevators’ in the lines of similar legendary efforts by demon king of mystical Lanka, Ravana who is said to have tried for establishing a ladder leading to heaven from earth. His ‘Childhood’s Ends’ is considered as best novel by some critics. Clarke had a fascination with the paranormal and stated that it was part of he inspiration for Childhood’s End. He signed in the early 1970s a three-book publishing deal, a record for a science-fiction writer at the time. ‘Rendezvous with Rama’ came out to be the first in 1973, which won him all the main genre awards.

He left written instructions for his funeral which stated:

“Absolutely no religious rites of any kind, relating to any religious faith, should be associated with my funeral.”

Professor Edward Lorenz

Professor Edward Lorenz, meteorologist and mathematician died at the aged of 90 on April 16 2008. Father of modern chaos theory he became a midnight celebrity with his talk entitled, “Predictability: Does the Flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?” He first published his work on chaos theory in the early 1960s, but it was this talk he gave in 1972 which brought him wider attention. As a child he was always fascinated by the weather and natural phenomena – an interest which he retained throughout his life. He writes in his autography, “As a boy I was always interested in doing things with numbers, and was also fascinated by changes in the weather”.

Professor Edward Lorenz was born on May 23 1917 in West Hartford, Connecticut and educated at Dartmouth College and Harvard University. His chaos theory caused an impact worldwide but amazingly much before to it Jagdish Chandra Bosewrote a story on a similar theme which is credited to be the first true science fiction story written in Bengali. Published in 1896 and entitled, “Palatak Toofan” [absconded tempest] the story described how a severe surge of the sea could be appeased by even a drop of oil and could save a ship. In similar vein Edward Lorenz, showed how small actions could lead to major changes, what is now usually referred to as the “butterfly effect”. He figured out in the 1960s that small differences in a dynamic system such as the atmosphere could set off enormous changes.

Having earned degrees in mathematics from Dartmouth College in 1938, from Harvard University in 1940, and degrees in meteorology from MIT in 1943 and 1948 he served as a weather forecaster for the U.S. Army Air Corps in World War II. By showing that certain deterministic systems have formal predictability limits, Lorenz put the last nail in the coffin of the Cartesian universe and fomented what some have called the third scientific revolution of the 20th century, following on the heels of relativity and quantum physics. He was a perfect gentleman, and through his intelligence, integrity and humility set a very high standard for his and succeeding generations. He won the Kyoto Prize for basic sciences in the field of earth and planetary sciences in 1991.

“Lorenz made his boldest scientific achievement in discovering ‘deterministic chaos,’ a principle which has profoundly influenced a wide range of basic sciences and brought about one of the most dramatic changes in mankind’s view of nature since Sir Isaac Newton.” the prize committee said.

North America & Strategic Technologies Space Technology Interview of Dr. Shehriyar Khateri April - June 2008 Monalisa Joshi

While WMD hold the centre stage of international politics, its victims often suffer from neglect and insensitivity. Dr. Shehriyar Khateri, a physician, works determinedly for the cause of chemical weapons victim in Iran. He spoke to our Assistant Editor, Monalisa at Bangalore and responded to the questions via E-mail. An excerpt-

1. What is the NGO SCWVS about?

The Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS) is a non- Governmental, non-Profit organisation, established in 2002.

The founders were a group of veterans of Iran-Iraq war who had experienced war and chemical attacks during 80s.

The SCWVS is dedicated to conducting awareness programs to increase public knowledge about the aftermath of war and weapons of mass destruction as well as about the importance of peace and the abolition of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

2. What is the kind of work it does?

Awareness programs through: photo exhibitions, art exhibitions, meetings and conferences.

Conducting research projects and studies in collaboration with universities and academic institutes addressing health impacts of chemical weapons, and the psychosocial problems of survivors and subsequently planning for interventions to improve quality of life and health status of them and their families.

3. What is your role?

I am in charge of the public and international relations of the organisation.

4. How does your training as medical personnel help you to deal with the subject of chemical weapons?

Indeed, as a physician I have been dealing with the long term health problems of the veterans and survivors of war, including the gas attacks survivors and I deeply understand how devastating the health consequences of war are and how necessary is to try to abolish chemical, biological and nuclear weapons from the world.

5. Does this training also help you in your personal interaction with the victims? In terms of building confidence etc.

Absolutely, although as a physician I am unfortunately aware of the fact that there is no cure for exposure related illnesses but we always try to help them on how to cope with their illnesses and how to improve their mental status despite their suffering.

6. Could you give us a brief background of the chemical weapons attack on Iran?

During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) Saddam Hussein’s regime used chemical
weapons against Iranian civilians and soldiers as well as against Iraqi Kurds in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This was the most extensive use of chemical weapons since WW I and left thousands of persons killed and injured.

Seven official reports by UN expert teams during the war confirmed the use of Mustard gas and Nerve agents by Iraqi army against Iranians including: S/16433 , S/17127, S/17911, S/18852, S/ 19823, S/20060, S/20134.

Some of the major attacks are:

  • Majnoon islands, March 1984–first use of nerve agent and mustard gas on a large scale.
  • Sardasht, Iran, June 28, 1987–first mustard bombardment of civilian residential areas of a city.
  • Halabja, Iraq, March 16, 1988–first massive nerve agent attack on civilian residential areas of a city.

As the results of those chemical attacks, about 1 million civilians and soldiers were exposed to chemical warfare agents (low dose or high dose), more than 100,000 were seriously injured and more than 6000 were killed as the direct results of the gas attacks in the battlefield.

Now 20 years on, more than 55,000 Iranians are suffering from serious long-term health effects of exposure to Mustard gas and need medical care.

7. What were the chemicals used in the attack?

According to Iraq, between 1983 and 1988—their military consumed almost 19,500 chemical bombs, over 54,000 chemical artillery shells and 27,000 short-range chemical rockets, containing 1,800 tonnes of Mustard, 140 tonnes of Tabun and over 600 tonnes of Sarin.

8. What were the long term effects of such attacks on the victims?

Studies of Iranian scientists’ reveals that the most common long-term health effects of exposure to Mustard gas are:

  • Respiratory problems including
    • Chronic Bronchtis / Bronchiolitis
    • Airways stenosis
    • Damage of the wind pipe structure (tracheomalacia)
    • Recurrent lung infection
    • Decreased respiratory volumes and lung function
  • Eye lesions including
    • Corneal damage/melting/ perforation
    • Dry eye
  • Skin lesions
    • Scars
    • Dry skin
  • Psychological disorders

According to chamber, field, and patch tests run by the US Army during the Second World War, in which over 60,000 US servicemen sustained varying degrees of exposure to mustard gas, the following specific health problems are caused by exposure to
mustard agent:1

  • Respiratory cancers (nasopharyngeal, laryngeal, lung)
  • Skin cancer
  • Pigmentation abnormalities of skin
  • Chronic skin ulceration and scar formation
  • Chronic respiratory diseass (asthma, chronic bronchitis, emphysema, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease—COPD, laryngitis)
  • Eye problems (recurrent corneal ulcerative disease, delayed recurrent keratitis of the eye, chronic conjunctivitis)
  • Bone marrow depression and immunosuppression as an acute effect.
  • Psychological disorders (mood disorders, anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress
    disorder, other traumatic stress disorders).
  • Sexual dysfunction due to scarring the reason for these effects can be traced to the alkylating effects of mustard: Mustard agents are DNA- alkylating agents and are
    extremely cytotoxic at low doses. DNA alkylation CBW is probably responsible for
    the mutagenicity of mustard agents. These agents also alkylate RNA and proteins and
    can, at moderate to high doses, produce non repairable DNA lesions (genotoxicity).

9. What could be certain preventive measure against a chemical weapon attack?

There is no certain prevention measure but when a chemical weapons attack or threat happens, the most important things to be considered are: improving defence measures, increasing public knowledge and training programs, protection equipments, medical
countermeasures casualty management and decontamination.

10. Do you think that the international community has not handled the chemical weapons victims of Iran with sensitivity?

As mentioned earlier, Following Iranian allegations that Iraq was using chemical weapons during the Iran- Iraq war from 1980-1988, the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, sent a number of specialist teams to investigate the situation.
Although the war was still in progress the team visited battlefields and medical centers, met with casualties and took samples from contaminated materials, including unexploded bombs. Their reports raised awareness of the shocking use of chemical
weapons by Iraq. Since the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime was in clear violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and given that the UN expert missions unanimously concluded that chemical warfare agents had indeed been used, the UN
Security Council should have taken immediate strong action to stop such activities. It was its responsibility to do so.

Due to its lack of such action, Saddam Hussein’s regime continued, with impunity, to use even greater quantities of chemical warfare agents on a larger scale, against both soldiers and civilians.

Therefore, there is no doubt that the international community including the United Nations and the Security council failed to fulfill their responsibility to try to stop the violation to International Humanitarian law and a big war crime which caused the
death and suffering of tens of thousands of people.

11. What is the link between Biological, chemical and toxic weapons?

Both are known as so called Weapons of Mass Destruction as they are indiscriminate weapons and they have a nature of causing superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.

12.What are the new and emerging chemical weapons?

Although at the moment 183 countries are member stated of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and it has been stipulated in the CWC that development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons are prohibited moreover the states parties
which have stockpiles of chemical weapons must destroy their CW arsenals by 2012, but unfortunately there are still a few states which are neither member of CWC nor many
other disarmament treaties and are real threats to the world peace, they not only have huge arsenals of CW but still developing more dangerous Chemical and Biological agents which can be used by themselves or terrorist groups and may cause a disaster for the world. 13. In terms of their lethality and after effects how would you rate
chemical weapons in the category of WMD?

I am not going to say that chemical weapons are the most dangerous types of so called WMD but I would rather say that having a strong international treaty for total ban of such weapons (CW) urging all member states toeliminate these inhuman weapons and
not to use chemical weapons under any circ*mstances is an indicator that the world community has considered chemical weapons as the most dangerous types of WMD as we do not have such obligations about other kind of weapons even Nuclear and Biological weapons!

14. What do you think are the reasons that chemical weapon are used in war fighting and against civilians?

Simply, lack of respect to international law and the rules which are created to save the human being from the crimes against humanity and to protect human dignity.

15. How effective is the moral norm against the use of inhumane weapons?

Lessons learnt from the disastrous events of 1980s and the violation of Saddam’s regime to many principals of international humanitarian law including the 1925 Geneva protocol reveals that the international obligations are necessary but not enough to guarantee the ban of the use of inhuman weapons and to prevent war crimes.

When Saddam’s regime was using chemical weapons against Iranians in a large scale and was gassing even civilians, the world community just turned a blind eye and let him to gas more people.

Even those nations which are always known as sensitive nations about the war crimes and violation to international law, did not react and forgot about the international law, so Saddam’s regime killed more people with impunity.

Since Saddam was an ally of big powers then and he was using inhuman weapons against a country which was considered as an enemy of certain countries, it was O.K. but later even suspicions that he may have WMD arsenals justified a full scale military
invasion to Iraq in violation of the UN charter! And even using inhuman weapons like Depleted Uranium (DU) weapons.

16.What is the role of global politics in the issue of chemical weapons?

Not to use the CWC and other international treaties as tools for the sake of interests of big powers but to respect them as the basic rules of humanity and justice.

17. Do you see a similarity of chemical weapons victims in Iran with the victims of Bhopal Gas tragedy in India in 1984?

Although Bhopal gas tragedy was an industrial accident and what happened in Iran was a war crime but there are similarities:

1. Both survivors developed chronic health problem and many are still suffering from disabling illnesses related to exposure to toxic chemicals.
2. Both survivors are also suffering from being ignored, they were (and still they are) forgotten by the world community, the perpetrators were not tried in a fair trial and were not punished as they should be.

18.Is there an International law that provides relief and compensation to chemical weapon victim and punishes the perpetrators?

Use of chemical weapons is clearly a violation of International Humanitarian Law and it was the responsibility of internationalcommunity to react against the grave breach of International Humanitarian Law and war crimes that Saddam committed during its war with Iran.

19.Are there any compensatory claims for a chemical weapon’s victim?

Unfortunately, nobody was ever tried for the war crimes of the use of chemical weapons against Iranians, this was even excluded from the list of Saddam’s charges in his trial and he was not given the chance to speak about his atrocities against Iranians and about those who supplied chemical weapons and its precursors for his regime.

No international tribunal was set up to address the war crimes of Saddam during his invasion to Iran including the use of chemical weapons. The victims of chemical weapons attacks have never received any compensation for their suffering because of the above mentioned reasons.

20. What course of action and relief can chemical weapons victims claim for?

First of all they need to be recognized by the world community as victim of a war crime.

Secondly they need international contribution by world medical community to help them to cope with their chronic, progressive illnesses.

Third, they seek justice; they need the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks to be punished and those who supported Saddam’s regime to be tried in a fair international tribunal.

21.Has this work with chemical weapon’s victim affected you personally?

Undoubtedly, witnessing the suffering of CW victims and living with them, dealing with the long lasting health effects and serious psychological impacts of such weapons makes me more determined to do my best to prevent the repeat of such disasters and
to promote culture of peace.

22.Do you think enough is being done in terms of Treaty, Conventions at the international level to prevent chemical weapons use?

I believe that the existing Chemical weapons convention is strong enough in terms of its legal aspects to ban the development, production, stockpiling and the use of chemical weapons in an international level.

23.What are the efforts that can be undertaken to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons?

First, Putting pressure on those states which have not signed and ratified the CWC yet, to join the convention as soon as possible and to help the universality of the convention.

Second, putting pressure on those states which have not fulfilled their commitment regarding the destruction of their chemical arsenals based on the CWC obligations.

24.What more needs to be done?

Awareness! Awareness! Awareness! To make people aware of the danger of such devastating weapons and to recall them the human tragedy of WWI and Iran-Iraq War.

The survivors of 1980s chemical attacks are still alive and they are a witnesses of the most recent large scale use of Chemical weapons, their eye witness accounts are the best awareness messages, their chronic coughs, their skin scars and their burnt eyes have powerful messages to everybody: Never again

25.Any other issue or question that has not been mentioned before and you would like to talk about.

Whilst talking about the chemical weapons convention, don’t forget the victims!

References

  • 1. Pechura, Constance M., and David P. Rall, editors.Veterans at Risk: The Health Effects of Mustard Gas and Lewisite.Committee to Survey the Health Effects of Mustard Gas and Lewisite. Division of Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993, pp. 216-7
Chemical Weapons (CW), Iran, Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS) Is Bioterrorism Threat Credible? April - June 2008 Animesh Roul

Even terrorists play pranks on WMD use these days! Late May 2008 a purported terrorist video caught media attention and some serious coverage. As per the reports, the Al Qaeda video message urged Islamic jihadists to use “biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to attack the West.” Experts suspecting the authenticity of the video message dismissed the threat as a prank and not ‘Qaedaesque’ enough to get scared.1

Much water has been passed since the anthrax scare which had taken its limited toll against the most powerful country on earth immediately after the events of 9/11 terrorists events in the US. Though limited in its spread, experts have concluded that the worst situation would arise mainly due excessive human interference in the natural process of life. A substantial part of the threat also constitutes the malign use of naturally occurring organisms (biological agents) by mankind in general and terrorists in particular. There are many factors that attract a terrorist group towards biological weapons and biological weapons attack. Most important is their toxicity. In addition, their un-detectability and capacity to reproduce rapidly make biological weapons a weapon of choice for terror groups.

Biological Weapons Use: Real Time or Futuristic

The big question is whether the threat of biological weapon use is real or a product of fearful future thinking? Plausibly enough, we are passing though a time where innovation is the key to survive. But as far as terrorist groups are concerned, they not only wish to survive, but endeavor to thrive with continuous innovation and improvisation. Trends show that terrorists in South Asia, particularly in India, have always improvised their tactics and methods, be it in suicide attacks, serial blasts, handling improvised explosives using pressure cookers, hurling grenades recruiting unemployed civilians or in choosing targets (temples, Mosques and busy market places).2 And if intelligence reports are to be believed, they have graduated to snipers for targeting high-profile political or business personalities in India. In the face of this continuous up-gradation of terror tactics, use of biological weapon or deadly pathogen by terrorist groups or a ‘lone wolf’ into civilian population or targeting individuals, might be probable.

Equally imperative to note is the nature of the biological weapon agents. Biological weapon could be lethal in the hands of non-states actors like terrorists, religious cults, and Mafia syndicates. International terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda have made unexpected efforts in developing bio-weapon capability among other weapon of mass ‘disruption/destructions (WMD) in the past and possibly, are doing so even now.

Historically, no terrorist group or religious cults achieved success in employing biological weapons or live pathogen at a large scale. However, there are ample evidences of the use of biological agents by some groups with little success. These attempts managed to scare and disrupt the society at large.

In 1984, the Rajneesh cult in Oregon, US, intentionally and indiscriminately contaminated a number of salad bars with a strain of salmonella bacteria. Over 700 people got affected with gastrointestinal illness, though nobody died in this incident. The cult members used commercially available biological agents to incapacitate people. Their aim was to win voters at bay during the local election. In 1994, a Japanese group called the Aum Shinrikyo unsuccessfully attempted to spread botulinum toxin and other agents in the city, before committing the dreaded subway Nerve gas attack. In 1998, a microbiologist linked to white-supremacist groups in the US had threatened military-grade anthrax in Las Vegas. His threat though later turned out to be harmless; generated widespread fear within civil society and security forces. The other important case occurred in post 9/11 terrorist strikes. Anthrax laced letter attacks causes five deaths and more than 15 people were severely ill. Unlike most other pathogens, anthrax is considered to be most potent and virulent.

In 2003, at least four Ricin related incidents took place. In the beginning of the year, on January 5, 2003, six Algerians, believed to be part of the ‘Chechen network’, Ansar al-Islam, a group linked to Al Qaeda and Iraq were arrested during a raid on a flat in Wood Green, North London, by the British security agencies. They were in the possession of Ricin. Castor seeds and equipments to make Ricin were also recovered from the flat. In March, traces of Ricin were found by the police in two phials inside a locker at Gare de Lyon railway station in Paris. On October 2003 a metallic container with Ricin was discovered at a Greenville, postal facility in South Carolina, United States. A November 2003 disclosure confirms that traces of Ricin were also found in mail bound for the White House. No one was hurt in any of the four cases, fortunately.

In South Asia, Tamil rebel groups had threatened to use biological materials against
the native Sinhalese in the early 1980s. The rebels threatened to spread Bilbariasis and Yellow Fever in the country and allegedly laid out plans to attack rubber plantations and tea gardens using anti plant agents. Again in Sri Lanka, recently in March 2008, this scare tactic surfaced when the UN Department of Safety and Security, located at Bauddhaloka Mawatha, Colombo, issued one intra organisation advisory following the receipt of suspicious packages with powder substance at one of the government agencies in Colombo. The suspicious packet was comprised of a threatening letter which contained a white powdery substance.

There are recent reports that Al Qaeda’s Abdur Rauf, a Pakistani microbiologist has searched every corner of Europe to obtain anthrax spores and equipment for Al Qaeda biolaboratory in Afghanistan to weaponise the pathogens, much before 9/11 events. Not to forget Menad Benchellali’s covert activities and his quest to weaponise Ricin, before his arrest in early 2004, in his bio/chem laboratory in Lyon, France. Benchellali, an Al Qaeda trained terrorist, was convicted in 2006 along with 24 others. His handling of bio/chem material in small laboratory and expertise under terrorists’ disposal opened a can of worms. Somebody has rightly pointed out that Benchellali’s case had opened the door of secret world of bio-terrorism.

Why Islamist terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, are employing and indoctrinating scientists, trained microbiologists in its fold? The answer may be still unknown, but conventional wisdom suggests that there is a hidden design in place and that certainly involves intentional fiddling with life science and living organism. The picture is still hazy. The news about a couple of Indian origin doctors among others in their fraternity from Jordan and Iraq had been detained and suspected in connection with the foiled attacks in Glasgow and London last year might make the picture more clear.3 The attempted bomb attacks by trained doctors who have undergone life science and pathological laboratory training to save human life, now on a terror call, are certainly very disturbing. This is not all! Investigations into a terror web forum suggest that around 45 (all Muslim) doctors planned a consorted Jihad against the US.

Again, analysts have stumbled upon chemical and biological weapon manuals being circulated in Jihadi web forums over the internet. This finding makes the bioterror threat more plausible, even though, these openly available manuals can help terrorist to develop crude biological weapon with minimum lethal factor. A survey published by
Jane’s Intelligence Review (2007) indicates that chemical and biological weapons on
password protected web forums constitute a part of jihadi discussion. At least two longer manuals on biological weapons have found in these Jihadi forums which describe methods for growing plague bacteria and botulinum toxin.4

Conclusion

Knowledge about the Aum Shinrikyo (Japan) and Rajneesh (Oregon, US) episodes is available, however one could only speculate the biological weapons capacity of
International terror groups such as Al Qaeda’s. This is perhaps to downplay the latter’s reach and interests in acquiring and using them.

Of course, the intelligence community does not have the evidence about Al Qaeda or any terror outfit going beyond the initial exploratory. But the paucity of empirical data on terrorist use of biological weapons does not limit their future planning concerning biological weapon. By leveling the whole bioterrorism issue as absurd would be too simplistic and immature on the parts of strategic thinkers or policy makers.

Knowledgeable observers opined that it is a matter of time car bombs would replace biological pathogen filled balloons, if not hitech delivery systems. Indeed, it is not very hard to stretch imagination on why five among the eight suspects have training in microbiology5 and working for Al Qaeda’s Jihadi agenda. Opinion is still divided between the alarmists and those holding an imminent bioterrorism threat to be far-fetched. Though time and again this insidious threat has been downplayed by India’s counter-terror mandarins citing non-existent earlier cases in this part of the world, it is just a matter of time to witness a germ unleash of apocalyptic nature.

Reference

  • 1. "A Scary Prank About Al Qaeda and WMD”, New York Times Blog, May28,2008, http://helede.blogs.nytimes.com/
  • 2. Author’s observation.
  • 3. “Terror plot hatched in British ospitals”, The Independent, July 3, 2007. http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime /terror-plot-hatched-in-british-hospitals-
    455630.html
  • 4. For more detail on these Jihadi web forums and their discussions, See, Anne Stenersen, “Chem-Bio Cyber Class,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2007, pp. 8-13.
  • 5. On Why a individual scientist engaged in pathogen research warrants careful monitoring, See, Christain Enemark, “Biological Attacks and the Non State Actor: A Threat Assessment,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol.21(6), December 2006, pp. 911-930.
Al Qaeda, Bio-terrorism Mizoram on the Verge of Another Mautam? April 01, 2008 Namrata Goswami

Mizoram’s bamboo groves have been bursting into flower since November 2007, causing famine-like conditions. It is not as if the locals have been caught unawares. Since the flowering occurs over a 48-49 year cycle, it was obvious to all in this tiny hill state of North East India that the Melocanna baccifera (local specie of bamboo) would burst into flower in 2007-2008, as it had in 1959 with all the attendant consequences. Adding to local lore, the Rain Forest Research Institute in Jorhat, Assam, had estimated the frightening predicament of bamboo flowering in 2007-2008 across 6000 of the 21,000 square kilometres of the state. The flower by itself is not harmful to people, but the fruit borne by it attracts huge hordes of rodents from neighbouring states and countries, which, moreover, rapidly multiply under such plentiful conditions. Like it happened in 1959, this time round as well, rodents have plagued the landscape feasting on the bamboo's protein-rich fruit as well as on local food grain stocks and the growing paddy in the fields. According to the latest state agricultural department figures, an estimated 38,247 metric tonnes of paddy have been destroyed, affecting 72.5 per cent of agrarian families in 659 villages across Mizoram.

The consequences have been devastating. Nearly 100,000 people out of a total population of 888,573 (2001 census) have gone without staple food items since February 2008 and face the prospect of starvation. According to an Action Aid team that visited the affected areas in February 2008, “there were rats all over the fields. Farmers would go to harvest their crops and find that the entire field had been eaten overnight.” To deal with this predictable crisis of nature, the Mizoram government had established a Bamboo Flowering and Famine Combat Scheme (BAFFACOS) programme since 2004, with sanctioned funds of Rs. 12.5 lakhs for famine relief. BAFFACOS, no doubt, has been on the alert since November 2007 but its efforts have been ineffective in thwarting the boom in the rodent population (from thousands to millions) within a matter of four months. To make matters worse, the Director of the state’s Disaster Management unit, P.C. Lalthlamuana asserts that the flow of relief from New Delhi has been abysmal.

As history informs us, an ill-conceived state response to such natural calamities could result in the militarization of society as was the case in Mizoram in 1959. In 1959-60, famine caused by bamboo flowering and attendant explosion in the rodent population resulted in many mautam, which in the local dialect means "bamboo deaths". Due to the lacklustre response of the then Union government as well as the Assam government in providing famine relief, Mizos on their own formed the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) led by Pu Laldenga. MNFF succeeded in providing much needed succour to the people, and subsequently Laldenga transformed it into an armed movement, the Mizo National Front (MNF), that sought independence. The proximate cause of the frustration and anger of MNF supporters was the central and state governments’ insensitivity to the plight of the people during the 1959 famine. The conflict was subsequently resolved with the 1986 Mizo Peace Accord and grant of statehood to Mizoram in 1987.

This time again apathy seems to be the hallmark of the response of both the central and state governments to the ongoing crisis in Mizoram. Despite early warnings of the impending disaster, no serious efforts have been made to satisfactorily address the crisis. It has been predicted other northeastern states like Tripura and Manipur as well as Southern Assam are also likely to be affected by the bamboo flowering phenomenon. Across the Mizoram border in Myanmar, Chin state has also been severely affected by bamboo flowering and consequent rodent outbreak. The absence of any “redressal” policy by Myanmar and the dearth of international aid have forced many Chin families especially from Paletwa, Matupi, Thantlang, Falam and Tonzang to flee to Mizoram. The affected Chin population numbers two lakhs and could increase further. These refugee flows coupled with Mizoram’s own affected population could precipitate a major internal crisis.

Ironically, the current Mizoram Chief Minister, Zoramthanga, was Laldenga’s close associate and right hand man both during the famine relief in 1959 as well as in the armed struggle waged by the MNF. Though he has been Mizoram’s Chief Minister for some years now, he does not seem to have formulated a policy to avert the disastrous effects of an anticipated famine. In a recent statement, he in fact contended that “we cannot deploy cats to kill rats or set traps on such a large scale. Even poisoning will not work. So, we are giving an incentive to people who kill rats. We are rewarding rupees two for every rat tail that is brought to us.”!

Instead of such cavalier statements and responses, what Mizoram’s leaders need to do is implement a four-pronged strategy to deal with the gathering crisis. First, a competent disaster management institution must be set up to formulate a district wise relief plan to cater to the needs of the affected people. At the same time, a special relief force must be immediately set up in each district for providing famine relief. Second, civil society bodies like the Young Mizo Association, Mizo Students’ Union, Mizo Zirlai Pawl, etc. should be actively involved in disaster relief. The youths’ knowledge of local areas must be tapped into and their advice sought for relief distribution. Third, an effective information campaign must be launched to explain to people the best ways of tiding over the crisis. For this, the help of paramilitary forces like the Assam Rifles must be sought, for their personnel possess excellent logistics and terrain knowledge. This would also have the additional advantage of increasing the level of trust between security forces and the common people. Fourth, Chin refugees from Myanmar should be housed in special camps so that they do not create fissures in an already stressed Mizo society. In addition, India must also press on Myanmar the necessity of activating a disaster control mechanism on its side of the border.

Terrorism & Internal Security Northeast India, Mizoram, Mizo National Front (MNF) For EU, Trade Will Trump Tibet March 26, 2008 Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay

The streets of Lhasa have started to become quiet once again. It would be just a matter of weeks if not months before the Forbidden City once again invites tourists to the roof of the world to experience ‘Tibetan culture’, the preservation of which has been one of the central demands of the demonstrators. Tibet would soon show its ‘normalcy’ to the world, with the Olympic Torch passing through it.

China’s strategy in Tibet is two-fold. On the one hand, Chinese authorities have adopted a strategy of protracted and futile negotiations to frustrate Tibetans and force their restive younger generation to resort to violent methods. This would make Beijing’s task easier of criminalising the movement and brutally crushing it. At the same time, it is also waiting for the present Dalai Lama to pass from the scene so that it could gain greater control over the Tibetan religious order. On the other hand, the process of Han-isation of Tibet and militarisation of its ecologically delicate landscape would proceed unabated so that the known face of Tibet would soon become unrecognisable to visitors who would not be able to find out an iota of dissent in this ‘autonomous region’.

On the external plane, Chinese foreign policy aims to counter legitimate concerns about human rights abuses, freedom of speech, movement and religious practices, rights of ethnic minorities, etc. These are legitimate concerns raised by the international media and watchdogs as well as Western governments, who have also been supporting the Tibetan cause and advocating a dialogue between the Chinese government and Tibetans. The Chinese strategy is to carefully cultivate and build a pool of Sinophiles in various countries who would support the Communist Party’s stand on various issues or at least remain silent. At the same time, it is also endeavouring to establish a pro-China trade and industry lobby in various countries in order to prevent their governments from undertaking any drastic measures against China. As it is, growing trade with China and the promise of the Chinese market have led to Sino-centrism among major industrialised countries, who have been struggling to find an appropriate way of dealing with China in the wake of the present uprising in Tibet without hampering their long-term trade interests.

The response of the European Union (EU), especially the major EU countries, is interesting to note in this context. Europe has a considerable number of supporters of the Tibetan cause and the Dalai Lama is a respected figure not only among the common people but among heads of governments as well. Besides, ‘a new generation of European leaders’ like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy are seen to be adopting critical stands towards China unlike their immediate predecessors. Moreover, there is constant pressure on the Union to take a more decisive and vocal stand on China, with the European media even urging the EU to boycott the Olympics.

Yet, on March 17, the EU under the current Slovenian presidency unanimously adopted the Ljubljana Declaration and ruled out an Olympics boycott arguing that the Dalai Lama himself has not ‘spoken out against a boycott’. For observers of EU affairs, the Ljubljana Declaration seems to be partly vague and open to multiple interpretations, leaving many questions unanswered. Firstly, though the declaration states that a boycott could “signify actually losing an opportunity to promote human rights,” it does not spell out how the EU is going to promote human rights by participating in the Beijing Olympics or what would be its position on Tibet after the Olympics. Similarly, when the declaration articulates that the “boycott could, at the same time, cause considerable harm to the population of China as a whole,” it leads to the plausible interpretation that a hypothetical boycott would actually play havoc on the Olympic industry in which Chinese and Western companies have ploughed a lot of investments – something that EU countries do not seem to wish to risk.

A basic fact needs to be highlighted here. The EU remains China’s most important trading partner; European exports to China in 2006 were worth about US $63.3 billion. Though there is resentment in Europe about the trade imbalance and lack of protection for intellectual property rights in China, the general trend has been one of major European leaders visiting China and signing huge trade deals and agreements to channel foreign direct investments into the fastest growing economy in the world. The EU’s response to developments in Tibet has to be seen against this backdrop.

For instance, last year, when Angela Merkel received the Dalai Lama at her Berlin office in a rare gesture, German industry expressed fears that it would actually pay the price for the Chancellor’s honest gesture. In the wake of the recent Tibetan protests, domestic opinion in Germany has been totally in favour of preserving Tibetan culture and the German government has demanded transparency from the Chinese side. In protest against Beijing’s handling of the issue, the German Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation has suspended talks with its Chinese counterpart. However, it is more than likely that the German response will be confined to such symbolic gestures. As Matthias Nass has pointed out in Die Zeit, “nobody wants to antagonise China” because of the need for its co-operation on a range of issues, including international terrorism, Iran and North Korea, as well as because of its mammoth foreign currency reserves.

Given the consensual nature of EU’s foreign policy making, a decisive common EU position on Tibet cannot be expected soon. Major European countries will announce their positions, after which the EU would shape its own collective position. This, in any case, will follow intense debate and closed-door negotiations. Going by the restrained responses of major European powers so far, it is more than likely that the EU’s trade interests will trump the cause of Tibet.

Nuclear and Arms Control Tibet, Human Rights, European Union, China DHD (N) and UPDS Agree to Ceasefire March 26, 2008 Namrata Goswami

People living in the two hill districts of Assam – North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong –witnessed a dim ray of hope for peace on March 18, 2008, when the Dima Halam Daogah (Nunisa) faction [DHD (N)] and the United Peoples’ Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) signed a ceasefire. The ceasefire came about during a joint meeting at Diphu, capital of Karbi Anglong, which was facilitated by the district’s Deputy Commissioner Dr. M. Angamuthu. The two groups have pledged to co-operate with the district administrations of North Cachar hills and Karbi Anglong for establishing peace. The March 18 cease-fire ground rules state that both outfits will stop targeting each other, provide information on cadre movements to the other in order to avoid accidental killings and limit their activities to the officially designated cease-fire camps. Most importantly, the ground rules also include the holding of regular joint consultations between the two outfits to find the best possible way of implementing the conditions laid out in the cease-fire. By itself, the truce assumes significance as it is for the first time in the North East that two insurgent groups fighting over over-lapping territory have signed such an agreement.

But the question remains whether the truce will hold, given that both outfits have had violent exchanges in the past and demand a Dimaraji and Karbi state, respectively, on over-lapping territory. Interviews conducted by the author with DHD (N) President and self-styled Commander-in-Chief, Pranob Nunisa, and Chairperson, Dilip Nunisa, in January 2008 revealed that both leaders are adamant in their demand for the creation of a separate Dimasa state within India, comprising areas of Karbi Anglong, parts of Nagoan and Cachar District in Assam, the entire North Cachar Hills as well as certain areas in Nagaland. The DHD (N)’s claims on areas in Nagaland ranges it against the NSCN (IM) and the latter’s claim for a Greater Nagaland. For its part, the UPDS leadership demands a Karbi state to be carved out of the same territory – Karbi Anglong district and parts of Nagaon district in Assam.

The decision to sign a ceasefire is perhaps informed by a common enemy – the DHD-(Garlosa) [DHD-(G)] faction led by the original founder of the DHD, Jewel Garlosa. The DHD had split in March 2003 after Jewel Garlosa refused to sign a cease-fire with the Union Government on January 1, 2003. Infamously known as “the Black Widow’, the DHD-G is a reclusive group based in the thickly forested areas of Maibang subdivision, Mahur, Laisong, Harangajao, Boro-Haflong and Haflong area of North Cachar Hills. Since its inception in 2003, it has wreaked havoc in both Karbi Anglong and North Cachar hills.

The worst of Black Widow violence occurred in October 2005 when it ravaged the UPDS in Karbi Anglong by killing more than 30 of its cadres and supporters. It has also hit out at the DHD-(N) faction by targeting its leaders like Naring Daulagapu in 2006 as well as its cadres since 2003 especially in the Dhansiri reserve forest area in Karbi Anglong. Just before the June 12, 2007 (postponed to December 2007) North Cachar Hills District Council elections, it eliminated three local Congress leaders with supposed links to the DHD (N). By killing high profile local politicians and targeting the DHD (N) and UPDS, the Black Widow has sought to assert its power in these remote areas of Assam. Police intelligence indicates that the outfit has been helped by the NSCN (IM) in its operations against the DHD (N) and the UPDS. Thus, despite its meagre cadre base of 150 to 200, the outfit has been successful in striking fear. In this situation, it makes political sense for the DHD (N) and the UPDS to sign a truce and join hands against a common threat. Both outfits have also signed cease-fire agreements with the Union Government. Predictably, therefore, the current cease-fire between the two groups will hold so long as the Black Widow sustains its ability to threaten them. Despite this, the ceasefire augurs well for civil society groups like the Karbi Apex Body, the Karbi Women’s Association, the Dimasa Apex Body, and the Dimasa Women’s Association. These local civil society bodies have been requesting the insurgent leaderships to come to a common understanding to end violence for many years now. However, for an overall atmosphere of peace to prevail, activities like extortions and kidnapping by the Black Widow need to be prevented. The March 13, 2008 kidnapping by the Black Widow of three employees of the Maharask East-West Corridor road construction project in North Cachar Hills in broad daylight indicates the government’s inability to sustain basic law and order in these remote areas. Moreover, the Black Widow targets smaller tribes like the Kukis, Hmars and Vaipheis living in these areas, which in turn has forced the latter to take up arms in self defence, leading to a vicious cycle of violence.

In this context, the truce between the DHD (N) and the UPDS could be beneficial for peace if utilised profitably. Given their numerical strength, terrain knowledge and cultural familiarity, armed cadres of these insurgent outfits should be gradually rehabilitated into “Special Local Forces” units funded by the state to safeguard not only their own ethnic kin but also smaller tribes from the violent activities of the Black Widow. Such a course would also provide these capable yet misguided youths an alternate means of livelihood in an otherwise economically desolate landscape. It is also important to institutionalise the present cease-fire agreement, and engage civil society actors to monitor and implement the cease-fire. This would limit the possibility of a future revocation of the cease-fire, as and when the Black Widow is weakened and the glue that holds DHD (N) and UPDS comes unstuck. Though the March 18 cease-fire is short on the promise of complete peace in these areas, it does have the potential to make the two insurgent groups behave responsibly and live up to their stated objectives of benefiting the societies they claim to represent.

Terrorism & Internal Security Northeast India, Assam, Dima Halam Daogah (DHD), United Peoples Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) Continuity and Change at the 11th National People’s Congress in China March 24, 2008 Raviprasad Narayanan

The recently concluded 11th National People’s Congress (NPC) held in Beijing from March 5-18 was noteworthy for two significant features – administrative restructuring of the government and introduction of personnel changes at the very highest echelons of the one-party state.

The seventh plenary meeting of the NPC was attended by 2946 deputies who voted to approve Government Work Reports and elect new leaders to high positions. As part of the process of ‘government institutional restructuring’ five supra ministries were created – the ministries of human resources and social security, industry and information, environmental protection, housing and urban-rural construction and transport. The very nomenclature of these ministries is suggestive of the spill over of the reform process and the administrative measures required to address dislocations. The admission by premier Wen Jiabao of an 8.5 percent growth rate in 2008 and the impact of the freak winter weather this year are pointers to the temporary slowing down of the world’s fourth largest economy.

The energy sector also came up for some administrative changes. In a measure to streamline government management of the energy sector, a national energy commission is to be established apart from the appointment of a high-level inter-ministerial coordinator and the creation of a national bureau of energy which will function within the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Importantly, the role and functions of the National Bureau of Energy will be related to managing energy requirements and capacity, coordinating the National Energy Leading Group and taking over the functions of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) on the management of nuclear power. With these changes, the State Council headed by Premier Wen Jiabao comprises twenty seven Ministries.

While administrative restructuring is typical of the need to emphasise ‘better governance and deliverance’ the Hu Jintao leadership has taken pains to point out the significance of political institutionalisation as a ‘necessity’ to keep China firmly on the reform track.

The personnel changes at the NPC deserve some attention. At the apex, Hu Jintao was ‘re-elected’ President for a five year term and so was Wen Jiabao as premier. The top lawmaker Wu Bangguo was ‘elected’ Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. Xi Jinping was ‘elected’ the new vice-president and replaces Zeng Qinghong. At fifty five, Xi Jinping becomes the vice-president less than six months after his elevation to the nine-member Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of Communist Party of China (CPC) last October. As vice-president, Xi Jinping will be heading the Central Party School (CPS), the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs bureaus as well as chair the leading group in charge of the Beijing Olympics later this summer.

A team of four new vice-premiers was ‘approved’ at the NPC. They are: Li Keqiang, Hui Liangyu, Zhang Dejiang and Wang Qishan. At fifty three, as first vice-premier, Li Keqiang, has had a dramatic rise within the leadership since he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC in October 2007.

The personnel changes at the top level with a new vice-president and first vice-premier is indicative of the leadership choices China has made to succeed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao when they step down in 2012-13. Both Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang represent a generation born after the founding of the People’s Republic and are widely considered to be the ‘core of the fifth generation’ although the Chinese media and academic circles do not label them thus. The Cultural Revolution was a phase that saw Xi Jinping sent to a remote village in Shaanxi province for six years and Li Keqiang work in a brigade attached to a commune for two years in Anhui province.

The selection of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang represent a fundamental shift in the nature of educational qualifications of the top leadership. If the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao leadership phases had brought to the fore a ‘technocratic’ dispensation, both Xi and Li represent the rise of a ‘legalist’ leadership with their backgrounds in law. This is reflective of the Chinese leadership’s constant emphasis on the ‘rule of law’ to be ‘transformed from a governing instrument to fundamental goal of reform.’ The ticket to legitimacy for the CPC apart from ensuring the success of the reforms is to put in place a system where the ‘rule of law’ is paramount.

Unless grave political mistakes are made by either Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang, the Chinese leadership in the post Hu-Wen period will be of a ‘legalist’ orientation fixated upon ‘maintaining the uniformity, solemnity and authority of the socialist legal system’ as well as one that will strive to ‘safeguard social harmony and stability’ – important themes in the light of recent incidents in Tibet.

East Asia China
Publication | Page 589 | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (2024)
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